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NOTE AND COMMENT
COMBINATION AMONG PHYSICIANS TO FIX PRICZS FOR PROFZSSIONAL SERV-
IsC.-The case of Rohlf v. Kasemeer et al., decided by the Supreme Court
of Iowa, November 18, igo8, and reported in i1S N. W. Rep., p. 276, although
primarily upon the construction of a local statute, involves a question of
general interest. The plaintiff therein, who is a physician. together with
thirteen others of the same profession, all residing and practicing in the same
county, entered into an agreement, combination or understanding, the terms
of wvhich are not given, but the object of which was to fix and maintain the
fees and charges to be exacted for medical and surgical services in said
county. The code of the state provided -that "any corporation organized
under the laws of this or any other state or country for transacting or con-
HeinOnline  -- 7 Mich. L. Rev. 237 1908-1909
MICHIG4N LAW REVIEW
ducting any kind of business in this state, or any partnership, association or
individual, creating, entering into or becoming a member of, or party to, any
pool, trust, agreement, contract, combination, confederation or understanding
with any other corporation, partnership, association, or individual to regulate
or fix the price of any article of merchandise or commodity, or to fix or limit
the amount or quantity of any article, commodity, or merchandise to be
manufactured, mined, produced or sold in this state, shall be guilty of con-
spiracy." The plaintiff and the others who were parties with him in the said
agreement, were indicted by a grand jury of the county for entering into a
combination to fix and maintain fees contrary to the provisions of the statute
hereinbefore quoted. The plaintiff, having been arrested under the indict-
ment, brought habeas corpus proceedings to secure his release from custody,
claiming undue and illegal restraint of his liberty, for the reason that no
offense known to the laws of the state was charged in the indictment, and for
the further reason that "if there be a law forbidding such acts as are charged
against him, it is unconstitutional and void, in that it deprives him of his
liberty, prevents him from acquiring or possessing property, and deprives him
of his safety and the pursuit of his happiness * * * and of the right of
contract and of the equal protection of the laws." The trial court discharged
the plaintiff and released him from the custody of the sheriff by whom he
was held.
It was contended by the appellants in the supreme court that the word
"commodity," as used in the statute, is broad enough to cover the charges
of a physician or surgeon for his professional services or skill,--indeed, that
it is broad enough to cover all kinds of personal labor, both skilled and
unskilled. There was perhaps some ground for this contention growing out
of a previous holding of the court to the etect that the same word in another
statute covered the- business of insurance, and that a combination to fix
insurance rates would be illegal. See Beechley v. Mulville, io2 Iowa 6o2, 7o
N. W. Rep. 1o7, 71 N. W. Rep. 4.8, 63 Am. St. Rep. 479. But the court
distinguished that case from the one under review by saying in effect that in
the former the parties were not selling their own services but were selling
insurance, which might well be regarded as al"commodity" as that term is
used in the statute.
In answering the contention of the appellants, the reviewing court refers
first to the rules of construction that should be applied in the case. As the
statute is a criminal one, nothing can be added to it by intendment, and
ordinarily such an act should have a strict construction. Further, in con-
struing any statute, all the language should be considered, even though we
are seeking the construction of but a single word, much of necessity depending
upon the context. Moreover, language, in the construction of a statute,
should, as a rule, be given its usual and ordinary meaning. Applying these
rules, the cotirt finds that the evident intent of the legislature was, not that
this statute should cover agreements as to prices for personal labor or effort,
whether skilled or unskilled, but rather that it should prevent combinations
to regulate or fix the price of movable things, the product of labor and
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industry, or to fix or limit the amount of such things that should be produced.
"The statute in question," says the court, "was aimed at unlawful conspiracies
or combinations in restraint of trade, and was manifestly not intended to
cover labor unions." In regard to the proper interpretation to be put upon
the word "commodity," as used in the statute, the court holds that, being a
general term, it must, under a settled rule of interpretation, be limited and
controlled by the special term "merchandise"; that so limited and controlled
it includes movable things that are the products of labor and tle subjects of
sale, but does not include labor, either skilled or unskilled. To hold that
labor is a commodity to be bought, sold or produced like merchandise, would,
according to the opinion of the court, be a strained and unnatural construc-
tion which ought not to receive judicial sanction. The judgment of the
reviewing court that the trial court was right in discharging the plaintiff
certainly has the support of reason and authority. See cases cited.
It may be suggested that the reason for the attempt to bring the agree-
ment of the doctors under this statute is not very apparent. It would seem
that it might be for the interest of the-public to have the fees of physicians
settled and fixed by agreement among themselves, even at high figures, in
view of the custom of many in the profession to gauge the charges for
services by -the ability of the patient to pay. H. B. H.
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